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Market Anthropology and Global Trade
Abstract

In economic anthropology, the concept of 'market' needs a more detailed elaboration. The traditional
distinction between barter and price markets does not suffice. One of the identifiable forms of market in
anthropology is the individualized, "subjective" market which is defined by the question: "What is my (!)
market?". It is characterized by competitive tension between economic rivals, not just by a good and an area.
Using this concept of the market in the subjective sense, some aspects of globalized economy look different
from hitherto held propositions. One of these aspects is a global competition law. An earlier draft proposal of
an international antitrust code will be discussed and related to the concept of the subjective market as well as
to the "convention method" of regulating crossborder legal issues in intellectual property law (the Paris and
Berne Conventions).
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Wolfgang Fikentscher*
I.
In economic anthropology, several modes of allocating goods to persons are
being distinguished. This is a very general way of explaining how and why
scarce goods may reach those who are in need of them. The four kinds of
such assignment of goods to persons in anthropology are distribution,
reciprocity, redistribution, and “market”.

Distribution means the simple hand out of a resource, for example a hunted
deer in a band of hunters and gatherers (anthropology books that only
describe “exchanges” often do not mention distribution because it no
exchange). Reciprocity designates an exchange by which one receives
something, and the other returns something, for example in a barter trade.
Redistribution takes a higher organization, for example by a chieftain or king,
who first collects from his subjects, and then distributes the collected items to
himself, his army, and his needy subjects. Finally, market is said to be the
institution in which a lot of people meet and barter or trade for some kind of
money.

This traditional picture of modes of allocation in economic
anthropology is in need of further elaboration, in particular with
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regard to the concept of
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the market. There are many more kinds of market than anthropology
anticipates thus far. The only accepted distinction as yet is between barter
and price markets.

Another distinction one should add here is the one between objective and
subjective markets. An objective market is a market viewed from bird’s eye.
For example the Taiwanese market, or the European market, each for a
certain merchandise which is being traded in that territory. A market in the
objective sense is defined by a good, let us say computer hardware, and a
geographic area, for instance Taiwan. Most microeconomics books do not
mention a time frame for that market. This is correct because modern
microeconomics tend to disregard time. Objective markets are not necessarily
competitive. For example, a marble factory at Hualien is not necessarily a
competitor of a marble dig in Australia because marble is too heavy to be
transported that far at economically acceptable terms. Still, both the Hualien
and the Australian marble producers are active on the Far Eastern marble
market, and the world marble market, both taken in an objective sense. There
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is a European bread market, but nobody ships bread from one end of Europe
to the other; it would perish. Objective markets are good for statistics,
development policies, “industrial policy”, and many issues that are called
“trade” as distinct from competition (trade regulation is different from
competition law).

A subjective market is not viewed from a bird’s eye perspection, but from the
view of a participant, a subject, regularly a merchant or a consumer, who asks
the question: What is my market? If one asks a merchant: “What is your
market”, she or he will answer: “I am exposed to the competition of at least
ten firms, and it’s stiff competition.” At closer sight, the persons active on a
subjective market are defined by adding the answers to two questions: For
whom am I - with my offers - an alternative; and: who is competing with me
in trying to attract demand. In other words, the subjective market is defined
by competitive tension. For this, a good, an area, and a time frame are
important determinants, but they are not sufficient. The test is competition,
not just good, area, and time. Those three determinants can only be indicators.

A second distinction between types of markets that anthropology does not yet
make but should make is the one between short-range barter or price markets
without extended credit relations – that is, markets “at arm’s length” – on the
hand, and long-range credit and trust markets on the other. Anthropologically,
long-range credit and trust markets are relatively “young phenomena”. As far
3

as we know, the earliest date back to the Greek commonwealth (“koiné”)
around 500 B.C.E. That period of time is often called by historians and
philosophers the “axial age” because of the many changes in religion, morals,
law and economy between 750 and 400 B.C.E. Long-range trust markets
before this time are not known.

On the other hand, not every post-axial-age market is a long-distance trust
market. There are post-axial age markets “at arm’s length”, such as the
typical bazaars in Arabian countries under the rules of Islamic shari’a.

Thus, for the purposes of economic anthropology (but with far-reaching
effects beyond) we discover three new pairs of market concepts: objective
and subjective markets, pre- and post-axial age markets, and short-range
(barter and price) markets and long-range credit and trust markets.

Against this anthropological background, it is possible to define the free
market system of the West, usually traced to the teachings of the Scottish
philosopher Adam Smith (1723-1790). The so-called free market in the sense
of Western economic teaching is a post-axial age, subjective, long-range trust
market. Compared with other possibilities offered by economic anthropology,
Adam Smith’s, that is, “our” Western free market system, is something rather
special. Anthropology knows many more forms which we cannot discuss
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here, but which also deserve their legal protection, because they exist in this
world.

For antitrust policy and law, this means a lot. Antitrust refers to subjective
markets because it wants to protect competition. Antitrust on long-range
credit markets ought to look different from antitrust on barter and short-range
price markets. On objective markets, and on non-market forms of allocation
of scarce goods, other legal instruments of protection are in place.

Why is this of interest? If one scrutinizes markets anthropologically, many
objections against globalisation become moot. Opposition against
globalisation will remain vivid as long as the distinction between subjective
and objective markets is not made. Antitrust policy and law should establish,
maintain, and restore competition on subjective markets. On objective
markets, there is no competition test, and statistics or structural policies are in
demand.

If a culture cherishes its own form of a market, or of another (non-market)
form of economic allocation of the scarce goods, as a rule it deserves
attention and respect. On the whole, if subjective markets are the focus of
consideration, antitrust law has to do with much smaller and non-global
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units.1 Rivalry is required, actual or potential, not just a merchandise and a
territory.

Moreover, since anthropology teaches us that there are other forms of
allocating scarce goods to those who need them, outside of markets,
competition cannot be the only yardstick of economic justice to be can be
applied in an indiscriminate manner. Allocation outside of markets can be
effectuated, for example, by distribution, (non-market) reciprocity, or
redistribution. Thus, anthropology makes us understand the economies of
collective goods. For example, if a delegate from Mongolia to the
International Monetary Fund says: “We need our pasture as a collective good
for the cattle of all of us and insofar want to engage in a distributive
economy”, this pasture should not be privatized and subjected to private
property and thus to competition. As yet, the IMF has shown little
understanding for this kind of argument.

We see that the distinction between forms of allocation of scarce goods in
terms of economic anthropology helps us to solve important economic and
legal issues. In antitrust, the distinction between objective and subjective
markets narrows down the relevant markets. In economic law in general, this

1
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distinction gives us a clear separation of trade-related and competition-related
issues. We can now distinguish between property-plus-competition defined
markets on the one hand, and non-market economies pertaining to collective
goods on the other. For the central concept of antitrust laws, the restraint of
competition, the requirement of rivalry eliminates the separate test of
“appreciability” (sensibilité, Spürbarkeit); since where there was rivalry
before the restraint, and no or less rivalry is after the restraint, there is always
the necessary appreciability because rivalry is something competitors (and
hence their suppliers or buyers) feel. By the same token, if the legal policy
underlying antitrust law is to prevent unjustified cartel, exclusionary
distribution and monopoly rents, on subjective markets (not on objective
ones), the proof of a restraint of competition triggers the assumption of a
violation of the antitrust laws, putting the burden of proof for the
reasonableness of the restraint upon the defendant. This is not so under the
antitrust rules which the European Commission in its “Whitebook” is now
being proposing as the future EU antitrust law. The simple reason for its basic
mistake is that the European Commission does note make a difference
between subjective and objective markets: on a subjective market, a restraint
of trade must be presumed illegal.

For neoclassic and neoliberal microeconomics , the introduction of the
concept of the subjective market has another impact of general importance.
As we have seen, the market definition in microeconomics is built upon the
7

two requirements of a good and a territory. Correctly, time is neglected
because modern microeconomics disregard the factor time. The subjective
market, defined by competitive rivalry, occurs for a good, in a territory, and
during a period of time. Therefore, the theory of the subjective market
reintroduces the factor time into microeconomics.

The concept of the subjective market has been deduced from economic
anthropology. Economic anthropology is usually regarded as a sub-field of
sociocultural anthropology, and sociocultural anthropology as a field of
cultural anthropology.2 At a closer look, this is only half of the truth.
Objective markets can be classified this way. But subjective markets include
competitive behaviour. Behavioural studies, in anthropology, belong to
ethology (Verhaltensforschung), and thus to biological (or physical)
anthropology. Thus, subjective markets require a combined study of cultural
and biological factors, whereas objective markets solely resort under cultural
anthropology.

II.
How does the Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC), a private proposal
for solving the needs of a worldwide economic law, and aiming at economic

2

See, for example, Wolfgang Fikentscher, Modes of Thought: A Study in the Anthropology of Law and

Religion, Tuebingen 1995: Mohr Siebeck, 92; also for the relationship to ethology.
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justice for all participants, try to answer the anthropological demands of the
various cultures and culture-specific forms of markets mentioned before.

The DIAC offers a pragmatic concept of competition for the use in a WTO or
WIPO convention agreement (and any convention should start from such a
concept). This pragmatic competition concept markedly differs from the
perfect competition model addressed in the WTO Annual Report 1997, vol. 1,
which is misleading and no longer up-to-date, and would seriously impede
rivalry-defined competition. As we have seen, what the books call “market”
in reality takes several forms:

First, there is the distinction between objective “anonymous” markets as
statistical entities defined by good, area, and time, however without
competitive rivalry, on the one hand, and non-anonymous, competitive, and
therefore “subjective” markets on the other. A subjective market is the
aggregate of a market participant’s perspectives of its alternatives for supply
or demand.

Secondly, there is the distinction between pre-axial age markets characterised
by short-range exchange relations such as barter markets or bazaars, and postaxial age markets shaped by the post-axial age modes of thought, of which
some but not all – according to the prevailing mode of thought – are
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characterised by far-range exchange relations including credit claims, trust
relations, and membership rights and duties.

This results in six possibilities. However in practice, pre-axial age subjective
markets, post-axial age objective markets, and post-axial age subjective trust
markets are the economically more important combinations.

How do these three important combinations relate to the modern world
economy as conceived by the World Trade Organization of 1994? By its
papers and reports, from an anthropological perspective it can easily be
demonstrated that the WTO errs in identifying world economy with only one
of the preceding three combinations, namely, with the post-axial age
objective market as its concept of economy. All the more so, since it can be
shown that grave consequences flow from this mistake. The market economy
as envisaged by the WTO is not what empirically is “out there” in the
economic reality. The same must be said of World Bank and IMF, as
evidenced by notorious development blunders. The DIAC tries to be open for
all kinds of economies.

The subjective market is the market as seen from the point of view of a
participant of the market. As mentioned before, the opposite concept is the
objective market, defined by a good, a territory, and a time frame but without
competition as a constituent factor (for instance, the European bread market).
10

Objective markets are good for statistics, and politics; they deal with issues
such as development test vs. competition test; trade-related aspects;
innovation; industrial policy; and trade issues.

The theory of the subjective market has another far reaching consequence
which has not yet been discussed.3 All books on micro-economics describe
the dichotomy of perfect competition and monopoly. Perfect competition is
defined, in micro-economics, as the activity on a market which is
characterized by homogenous products, unlimited information, unlimited
reaction speed, and infinitesimally small sellers and buyers who are too small
to engage in strategic behaviour.

Perfect competition denies strategic behaviour among market participants. On
perfectly competitive markets, there is by definition no rivalry between the
market participants as competition is practically stifled to zero. Therefore,
perfect competition is a way to define the absence of competition. The
mistake has its roots in the fact that the theory of perfect competition
envisages objective markets, instead of focusing on subjective markets and
their strategy-producing alternatives.

3

See Part I, last paragraphs.
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For this reason, for antitrust and unfair trade practices law purposes, the
common distinction between perfect competition and monopoly as the two
extremes of market behaviour is of no use. The correct dichotomy is rivalrydefined competition on subjective markets on the one hand, and monopoly
and perfect competition as two forms of non-rivalry defined market behaviour
on the other. Needless to say that in addition to the consequences described
above, the concept of the subjective market challenges many basic and firmly
held micro-and macro-economic assumptions.

Thus, a comparison of what we call a free market system, including the
possibilities of engaging in economic activities, under anthropological
scrutiny leads to the conclusion that the free market system is a culturespecific, namely western, and if applied worldwide, ethnocentric notion. Only
fragments of anthropological variability are being taken up and included in
what we often call “the economy”.

Americans sometimes are inclined to think that in these days “the free market
system” is on its way to pervade the whole world, and many Europeans share
this view. Maybe this is so, and should even be welcomed as a step to worldwide democracy and equal chances for everyone. But there is also evidence
that other cultures are afraid of this. The Muslim World cannot agree to
explicit advertising, the Siberians in their great majority fear democracy more
then anything else because it leads to the economic destruction of their
12

habitat, North American Indians wonder at the ‘frenzy’ (panicking as they
call it) that comes with the economy-oriented lifestyle of the “Anglos”, and
many traditional societies fear exploitation and assimilation.

Obviously, there are anthropologically economic variations in this world.
Consequently, in order to avoid an ethnocentric western world under the
auspices of WTO and World Bank System, other types of economy, and other
total economies, must be given appropriate standing in WTO and World Bank
System, such as

-

non-competitive distribution strategies,

-

systems of redistribution,

-

pre-axial age subjective markets (e.g. barter or other short-range
exchange), and

-

markets with different categories of marketable property, anthropologically
speaking, with different economic spheres.

III.

What are the additional features of the DIAC in relation to the insights from
economic anthropology gained before?
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Basically, there are four legal ways of dealing with cross-border issues: (1)
Uniform law, (2) harmonized law, (3) the convention approach, and (4)
conflicts-of law (“choice-of-law”). These are the most commonly applied
normative settings for solving cases which involve more than one legal
system.

(1)

Uniform law is the most complete and the least frequently achieved
approach; an example is the Geneva uniform bills of exchange and check law
of 1930. The abortive Havana Charter of 1948 aimed at a uniform antitrust
law, the UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code of 1980 is uniform
antitrust “soft law” (non-binding).

(2)

Harmonized law is less than uniform. It narrows the distinctions between
national laws while leaving minute differences to national legislature. EC
directives lead to harmonised national legislation. The American Law
Institute prepares harmonised state law.

(3)

Convention law has an even less harmonizing effect. Convention law allows
to implement national laws for solving cross-border cases while avoiding
heavy inroads to claims of national sovereignty. The Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 and the Revised Berne
Convention for the Protection of Copyrights are the two leading examples

14

(the U.S. is a member since 1887 and 1989). These conventions for the
protection of “intellectual property” make use of the following principles:

a)

application of national law to cross-border cases;

b)

national treatment of foreigners inside the country where protection is
sought (to avoid domestic discrimination);

c)

minimum standards representing common approaches or commitments of
protection to correct “consensus wrongs” in a non-discriminating manner
outside the country where protection is sought (to avoid a significant
discrimination between the member states); a list of minimum standards will
be given – in context with other results - in the summary;4

d)

the “union principle” which permits contemporaneous membership in
successive revisions of the convention (to permit flexibility and varying
degrees of progress in the regulation of concern without loosening national
membership); and

e)

the absence of a most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause (to permit the
application of the union principle, supra d), and the establishment of bilateral
agreements which often contain experiments in improvements of protection).

(4)

The fourth possibility of dealing with cross-border cases is the conflicts-oflaw approach. It is often called “choice-of-law approach” because in contract

4

See IV, under 4., below.
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law the parties are in principle permitted to opt for a national law to deal with
a cross-border case. But in many cross-border cases, there is no such freedom.
Rather, many conflict rules of national law require mandatory application.
Antitrust cases concern inequitable behaviour, comparable to torts. In general,
remedies against unfair trade practices are tort actions. The nexus between a
tort case and the applicable national law is the place of the wrong (forum
delicti commissi). In essence, the place-of-the-wrong rule is mandatory.

The place of the wrong may be inside or outside of the country where the
antitrust or unfair trade practice offence has been committed. If it is inside the
country, national law applies. If it is located outside the country where the
action is brought, foreign law (antitrust, or unfair trade practices torts law)
applies and is being adjudicated by national courts rather than the law of the
forum.

This difficult situation is aggravated by the fact that the conflict-of-law rules
may not only lead to the application of foreign national substantive law but
also to national conflicts-of-laws rules. The latter is rather the rule than the
exception. Then, the issues of renvoi and third-law application must be
decided.

Thus, resorting to the conflicts-of-law approach usually leads to the call for
an international harmonisation of the national conflicts-of-law rules. At this
16

point, the experts tend to favour the harmonisation of the substantive laws of
these countries interested in regulating their cross-border issues, rather than
harmonising their conflicts-of-law rules.

It was precisely this quagmire that caused the interested nations to conclude
the Paris and the Berne Conventions, a low-level substantive (and not
conflicts-of-laws oriented) harmonisation approach (“minimum standards”),
in the field of intellectual property protection.

The Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC) offers such low-level
harmonisation minimum standards of substantive law, while leaving detailed
and “custom-tailored” regulation to national legislature. It thereby aims at
safeguarding national traditions and economic cultures by use of general
clauses such as the Anglo-American common law principle of the rule of
reason. Anti-dumping is a practice extending into unfair trade practices law.

The DIAC is intended to demonstrate the possibility of applying the
convention approach to antitrust matters. Unfair trade practices rules, in
particular antidumping rules, can be added. In its various sections, a menu to
choose from is offered.

For preparing a transnational competition law, a cooperation between WIPO
and WTO would be helpful in drafting an international code. WIPO could
17

contribute its experience in the administration of the Paris and the Revised
Berne Convention. WTO could undertake the code’s actual implementation,
relying on its procedural machinery including its panel jurisdiction.Existing
institutional mechanisms between WIPO and WTO could be used. It is
noteworthy that the recently published WIPO Model on Unfair Practices
Rules does not tackle unfair pricing such as monopolistic discriminations.

The proposed convention treaty on free and fair competition would co-exist
along with the already existing and expanding network of bilateral antitrust
assistance treaties and agreements. Besides regulating special bilateral issues
of competitive trade and merger control policies, these treaties and
agreements would serve as precursors and in part as models for the
establishment and further development of a multilateral international
convention instrument. In the light of the ongoing globalisation of economic
relations, to rely solely on bilateralism may prove to be insufficient.

Reference may be made to the antitrust enforcement agreements between the
U.S. and the EC, Australia, Canada and Germany.

IV.

To summarize:
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1. In view of the tasks given to the WTO by the world community a
transnational antitrust and fair competition system is indispensable. “Free”
and “fair, in this sense, means a non-discriminatory level playing field,
covering, inter alia, the anti-dumping law. “Transnational”, in this sense,
means a law that is binding on the nation states and also – in contrast to
classical international law - entitles and obligates their citizens.

2. This transnational antitrust and fair competition system should seek its model
in the Paris Convention on the international protection of patents and against
unfair competition of 1883, and the parallel Revised Berne Convention on the
international protection of copyrights of 1886. Most governments are
members of both conventions.

3. Under this “convention approach”, the following principles of law prevail:

- national law (not international or “world” law such as in the abortive
Havana Charter),

- national treatment, to prevent transborder discrimination inside of a member
state,

- minimum standards for preventing “consensus wrongs”, committed in
transborder transactions between the member states,
19

- the “union principle”, to enable revision conferences, and thereby progress
and development, among a limited number of members, while maintaining
the membership of all.

- there should be no most-favoured nation clause, in order to leave the road
open to bilateral antitrust and fair competition agreements, containing special
entitlements, obligations, and cooperation in general. “Most-favoured nation”
(MFN) would preclude such bilateral “experimenting”. It would also preclude
the union principle (3, supra) and its revision mechanism. Art. 4 TRIPS
which provides for a most-favoured nation clause should be repealed or
modified.

4. The minimum standards, intended to prevent the commitment of “consensus
wrongs”, ought to include:

a)

a prohibition of horizontal agreements in restraint of trade;

b)

a prohibition of abusive distribution systems;

c)

a regulation of restraints of competition based upon intellectual
property protection;

d)

merger control;

e)

a prohibition of abusive market domination;

f)

a provision against circumventions of a) through e);
20

g)

a rule of reason exemption covering a) through f) that allows due
consideration of culture-specific forms of economy;

h)

minimum sanctions which would include deconcentration, divestiture or
dissolution of past mergers and monopolies;

i)

minimum procedural rules which could be borrowed from the existing and
already working panel jurisdiction of the WTO;

j)

a rule against unfair trade practices under Art.10 bis Paris Convention.

5. The concept of competition should be pragmatic, not theory-burdened. This
implies that competition includes rivalry (subjective market), and thus a
restraint of competition lessens this rivalry (“material and appreciable
restraint of competition”). This also implies that for a transnational antitrust
and fair competition law, the model of perfect competition and other nonrivalry defined (“objective market”) models are misguided. A market is a
market of a firm, a buyer, a supplies, a consumer, etc., under culture-specific
conditions.

6. In all, and in brief, what is needed is a convention, similar to the existing
Paris and Berne Conventions for the international protection of intellectual
property, for the international protection of competition, and this transnational
antitrust and fair competition convention should be integrated into the
existing panel system of the WTO.
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7. To this end, the members of the DIAC-Group submitted their proposal of an
“International Antitrust Code”. They suggest that efforts be continued.
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